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User Collusion Avoidance Scheme for Privacy-Preserving
Decentralized Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
Yogachandran Rahulamathavan, Suresh Veluru, Jinguang Han, Fei Li, Muttukrishnan Rajarajan, and Rongxing Lu
Abstract—Decentralized attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a
variant of multi-authority based ABE whereby any attribute authority
(AA) can independently join and leave the system without collaborat-
ing with the existing AAs. In this paper, we propose a user collusion
avoidance scheme which preserves the user’s privacy when they
interact with multiple authorities to obtain decryption credentials.
The proposed scheme mitigates the well-known user collusion security
vulnerability found in previous schemes. We show that our scheme
relies on the standard complexity assumption (decisional bilienar
Deffie-Hellman assumption). This is contrast to previous schemes
which relies on non-standard assumption (q-decisional Diffie-Hellman
inversion).
Index Terms—Attribute-based encryption, user collusion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) supports both confidentiality
and access control with a single encryption and has been identified
as a potential technology for data sharing in distributed environ-
ment such as cloud [1], [2], [5]. Four parties namely data owner,
users, attribute authority (AA) and storage server (i.e., cloud)
involved in ABE. Users identities can be defined as a set of
attributes (i.e., name, age, gender, location, passed driving test,
purchased premium TV channels, etc). AA maintains encryption
and decryption credentials for the users attributes. Data owner
chooses a set of attributes based on the type of data and uses
the corresponding encryption credentials for those attributes to
encrypt the data. Then the encrypted data will be uploaded onto
the cloud by the data owner. At the same time users obtain the
decryption credentials for a set of attributes by proving to the
AA that they are legitimate users for those attributes. If the users
want to access the encrypted data, then they will first download
the encrypted data from the cloud and will compare whether they
satisfy the set of attributes defined by the data owner during the
encryption.
The first ABE scheme was developed using single AA [2].
Later multiple AAs based ABE (MA-ABE) was proposed in [12],
since single AA ABE scheme allowed too much information
at single entity. In the MA-ABE scheme, there are multiple
AAs responsible for disjoint sets of attributes. In conventional
MA-ABE scheme, users interact with multiple AAs to obtain
decryption credentials for their attributes. If there is no privacy
protection for users then all AAs can share (collude) the particular
user’s information (attributes) to reveal the user’s identity. Hence
This work was supported by the Engineering and Physical Sciences
Research Council of the U.K. under EPSRC Grant EP/K03345X/1 and
National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61300213.
Y. Rahulamathavan, F. Li, and M. Rajarajan are with the School
of Engineering and Mathematical Science, City University Lon-
don, London, U.K. (e-mail: {Yogachandran.Rahulamathavan.1, fei.li.1,
r.muttukrishnan}@city.ac.uk).
S. Veluru is with the United Technologies Research Centre, Ireland.
(e-mail: VeluruS@utrc.utc.com). Part of this work done while the author
was with City University London.
J. Han is with the Jiangsu Provincial Key Laboratory of E-Business,
Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, Nanjing, Jiangsu 210003,
China (e-mail: jghan22@gmail.com).
R. Lu is with the Division of Communication Engineering, School of
Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore (e-mail: rxlu@ntu.edu.sg).
the focus of this paper is on achieving user privacy during
the interaction with AAs (interesting readers can refer [1]–[5]
for more details about ABE schemes). Let us provide concrete
example applications for the proposed algorithm.
The first potential application is healthcare where ABE has
been considered to provide fine-grain access control. The users
of healthcare application could be staffs at hospital and patients
i.e., they upload and retrieve sensitive data on daily basis [17].
Lets consider a scenario where diabetic patient wants to access
his medical data which is in fact encrypted using ABE and one
of the attributes is “Name of the Hospital". Unfortunately this
hospital is known for diabetic clinic and obtaining a relevant key
from AA (who may be a third party) responsible for “Name
of the Hospital" attribute will jeopardize the patient’s privacy
straightaway. However, the proposed technique allow patients to
access relevant information related to their condition without
revealing their attributes (i.e., type of disease, hospital, gender,
age) to the AAs.
The second potential application is smart grid where smart
gridŠs control center can use ABE to broadcast a single encrypted
message to a specific group of users (smart meters) [18]. Each
user in the targeted group can individually decrypt the message
based on their attributes. The attributes could be sensitive and
reveal users day-to-day electricity usage e.g., attributes such as
location, type of electrical equipment, subscription package can be
passively leak user’s private information. Because the same user
might have different homes and businesses at different locations
however some attributes such name, date of birth will be same for
all properties. If that is the case then, with some side information
and information resides at AAs, the user’s spatial-temporal profile
can be revealed by AAs. This vulnerability can be mitigated by
the proposed scheme.
Within this context first known privacy-preserving (PP) de-
centralized ABE scheme was proposed in [6]. The scheme in
[6] enables users to interact with AAs to obtain credentials for
attributes via anonymous protocol. However, the solution in [6] is
vulnerable to collusion attack [7] i.e., two users (colluding users)
who have obtained credential for an attribute o from an AA O
can generate credential for a third user for o without involving
O. This is a serious security issue since that third user in fact
may not satisfy o as part of his identity. Hence in this paper, we
propose a scheme which mitigates the above user collusion attack
using anonymous key issuing protocol. The main achievement of
this work is on tieing secret known for AA and secret known for
user in a non-linear fashion. This non-linear coupling withstands
the colluding users to generate new keys for unauthorized users
via algebraic operations.
Related Works: There are two main types of ABE namely
ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) and key-policy ABE (KP-ABE)
[2], [5] and the focus of this paper is on KP-ABE. The KP-
ABE scheme can be further divided into two: single AA ABE
and MA-ABE. Chase et. al. presented a MA-ABE scheme [11]
using trusted central AA for distributing all the keys [11]. MA-
ABE scheme without central AA has been presented by Chase
and Chow in [12] where, each pair of AAs securely exchange a
shared secret among them during the set up process. In [11], users
must submit their global identities (GIDs) to each AA to obtain
the decryption credentials. This will breach the user privacy since
a set of corrupted AAs can pool together all the attributes belong
to the particular GID.
In order to mitigate this privacy vulnerability, Chase and Chow
proposed an anonymous key issuing protocol in [12], whereby a
user can obtain the decryption keys from AAs without revealing
her GID. Even though the scheme proposed by Chase and Chow
eliminates the central AA, all the AAs must be online and
collaborate with each other to set up the ABE system hence it
is not fully decentralized. Similarly, various protocols have been
proposed to decentralize the ABE scheme [9]–[12], however, each
scheme has its own merits and demerits.
The first known fully decentralized (i.e., without central AA)
MA-ABE scheme was proposed in [9]. In [9], any party can
become an AA and there is no requirement for any global
coordination other than the creation of an initial set of common
reference parameters. Crucially [9] overcome the collusion vulner-
ability without any coordination between AAs by proposing novel
techniques to tie key components together and prevent collusion
attacks between users with different global identifiers. However,
the scheme in [9] does not preserve the user privacy i.e., attributes
of users can be collected by AAs by tracing users’ GIDs. The
scheme in [12] considers privacy but not fully decentralized. For
the first time, Han et al. proposed a PP decentralized scheme
for KP-ABE in [6]. In contrast to the existing decentralized
ABE schemes, the scheme in [6] preserves the user privacy and
relies only on decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) standard
complexity assumption.
In [6], the GID of the user is used to tie all the decryption
keys together, where blind key generation protocol has been used
to issue the decryption keys. Hence, corrupted AAs cannot pool
the users’ attributes by tracing the GIDs’ of the users from the
decryption keys. Unfortunately, the scheme in [6] cannot prevent
user collusion, hence, two users can pool their decryption keys to
generate decryption keys for an unauthorized user [7]. This is due
to weak bind between users’ GID and the decryption keys.
In this paper, contrasting to all the works in literature, we
propose a PP decentralized KP-ABE scheme in order to mitigate
the known user collusion security vulnerability [7]. We exploit
the anonymous key issuing protocol in [12] to strengthen the
bind between decryption keys and GID as well as to preserve the
user privacy. In order to incorporate the anonymous key issuing
protocol, we modify the PP decentralized KP-ABE scheme in
[6]. We prove this by contradiction that the proposed scheme is
secure i.e., we reduce the DBDH standard complexity assumption
to show that an adversary who can break the proposed scheme can
be exploited to break the DBDH assumption. We also proved that
the anonymous key issuing protocol is free from leak, selective-
failure and avoid user collusion.
II. DECENTRALIZED KEY-POLICY ATTRIBUTE-BASED
ENCRYPTION
The following notations are used throughout this paper: we
use x R
←−−−
X to denote that x is randomly selected from X .
Suppose Zp is a finite field with prime order p, by Zp[x], we
denote the polynomial ring on Zp. We used the following well-
known techniques as building blocks for our scheme: Lagrange
Interpolation, bilinear groups, decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman
complexity assumption, commitment scheme, proof-of-knowledge
and access tree (refer [2], [6] for more details).
In a decentralized scheme, any AA can join and/or leave the
system at any time without rebooting the system. First of all, we
will explain sub-algorithms and security game, original scheme
Global Setup (GS)− For a given security parameter λ, GS
generates the bilinear groups G1 and G2 with prime order p as
follows: {G1,G2} ← GS(1λ). Let e : G1 × G1 −→ G2 be a
bilinear map and g, h and h1 be the generators of G1. There
are N number of authorities {A1, . . . , AN}: Ak monitors nk
attributes i.e. A˜k = {ak,1 . . . , ak,nk}, ∀k.
AAs Setup (AS)− Security parameters of Ak:
SKk =
{
αk, βk, and [tk,1, . . . , tk,nk ]
}
R
←−−−
Zp,∀k. Public
parameters of Ak: PKk = {Yk = e(g, g)αk , Zk = gβk , and
[Tk,1 = g
tk,1 , . . . , Tk,nk = g
tk,nk ]}, ∀ k. Each Ak specifies an
(kk, nk) threshold access structure where kk ≤ nk.
Key Generation (KG)− Collision-Resistant Hash Function
H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp to generate u from the user global
identity. Attribute set of user is A˜u: A˜u ∩ A˜k = A˜ku ∀ k. Ak
generates rk,u ∈R Zp and dk = kk − 1 degree polynomial qk
where kk – threshold value of that node. with qk(0) = rk,u.
Now decryption keys for the user u is generated as follows:
D = Dk,u = g
αkhrk,uh
uβk
1 ,Dk,j = h
qk(ak,j )
tk,j , ∀ak,j ∈ A˜
k
u.
Encryption (E)− Attribute set for the message m is A˜m:
A˜m ∩ A˜k = A˜
k
m,∀k, i.e. A˜m = {A˜1m, . . . , A˜km, . . . , A˜Nm}.Data
owner of message m randomly chooses s ∈R Zp, and output the
ciphertext as follows:
C = C1 = m.
∏
k∈IC
e(g, g)αks, C2 = gs, C3 =∏
k∈IC
gβksand
{
Ck,j = T
s
k,j
}
∀k∈IC ,ak,j∈A˜
j
m
where Ic denotes
the index set of the authorities.
Decryption (D)− In order to decrypt C, the user u, computes
X, Y and Sk as follows: X =
∏
k∈IC
e
(
C2, Dk,u
)
, Y =
e
(
C3, h
u
1
)
and Sk =
∏
ak,j∈A
k
m
e
(
Ck,j , Dk,j
)∆
ak,j ,A˜
j
m
(0)
. User
then decrypts the message m as follows: m =
C1Y
∏
k∈IC
Sk
X
.
Fig. 1. The original decentralized key-policy attribute-based encryption
scheme [6].
in [6] followed by our PP decentralized KP-ABE. In Section III,
we incorporate the anonymous key issuing protocol to strengthen
the bind between user GID and decryption keys.
A. Sub-algorithms
In general decentralized schemes contain the following five sub-
algorithms:
Global Setup: This algorithm takes a security parameter as input
and output system parameters. These system parameters can be
used by AAs who join the system.
AA Setup: Each AA uses the system parameters obtained from
the global setup to generate public and private keys for the
attributes it maintains.
Key Issuing: User and AA interact via anonymous key issuing
protocol (see Section III) in order to determine attributes belong
to the user. Then AA generates decryption credentials for those
attributes and send them to the user.
Encryption: The encryption algorithm takes a set of attributes
maintained by AA and the data as input. Then it outputs the
ciphertext of the data.
Decryption: The decryption algorithm takes the decryption cre-
dentials received from AAs and the ciphertext as input. The
decryption will be successful if and only if the user attributes
satisfy the access structure.
B. Security Game
In order to avoid the security vulnerabilities, ABE schemes
should be proven to be secure against the selective identity (ID)
model [1]. In the selective ID model, the adversary should provide
the identities of the AAs (challenge identities) he wishes to
challenge the challenger with. Then challenger (i.e., the system)
will generate necessary parameters corresponding to the challenge
identities and send them to the adversary. Then the adversary is
allowed to make secret queries about the challenge identities. If
the adversary cannot decrypt the encrypted message at the end
with non-negligible advantage then the proposed scheme is secure
against the selective ID model. Formally, this is represented by
the following game between the adversary and the challenger:
Setup- Adversary sends a list of attribute sets and AAs including
corrupted AAs to the challenger. Now the challenger generates
public and private keys corresponding to the attributes and AAs
provided by the adversary. Challenger provides public and private
keys corresponding to the corrupted AAs to the adversary while
only public keys corresponding to the remaining AAs to the
adversary.
Secret Key Queries- The adversary is allowed to make any
number of secret key queries as he wants against the AAs.
However, the only requirement is that for each user, there must be
at least one non corrupted attribute AA from which the adversary
can get insufficient number of secret keys.
Challenge- The adversary sends two messages m0 and m1 to the
challenger in plain domain. Now the challenger randomly chooses
one of the messages and encrypt it and send the ciphertext to the
adversary.
More Secret Key Queries- The adversary is allowed to make
more secret key queries as long as he satisfies the requirement
given earlier.
Guess- Now the adversary guesses which message was encrypted
by the challenger. The adversary is said to be successful if he
guesses the correct message with probability 1
2
+ ǫ whereby ǫ is
a non-negligible function.
C. Construction of our new algorithm
Let us consider N number of AAs and denote them as
A1, . . . , AN . The attribute set managed by the AA Ak is denoted
as A˜k = {ak,1, . . . , ak,nk} ∀k. Let us first describe the original
algorithm in [6] in Fig. 1. Then in Fig. 2 we show how our
algorithm differ from [6]. Let us explain the important steps
involved in Fig. 1 and how our algorithm in Fig. 2 differs from
[6].
Initially, for a given security parameter λ, global setup al-
gorithm (GS) generates the bilinear groups G1 and G2 with
prime order p i.e., {G1,G2} ← GS(1λ). The AA setup al-
gorithm (AS) is executed by each AA to randomly gen-
erate public keys (PK) and the corresponding secret keys
(SK). The public-secret key pairs for Ak is given as
{(Yk, Zk, [Tk,1, . . . , Tk,nk ]), (αk, βk, [tk,1, . . . , tk,nk ])}.
Let us denote the attribute set belongs to user u as A˜u and
the common attribute set between user u and AA k as A˜ku i.e.,
A˜ku = A˜u
⋂
A˜k. Key generation (KG) algorithm will be used to
issue decryption keys to the user u with a set of attributes A˜u. The
algorithm outputs a key that enables the user to decrypt a message
encrypted under a set of attributes A˜ku based on threshold policy
i.e., if users satisfy more attributes than AA’s defined threshold
then the user can successfully generate decryption credential.
Since threshold policy is very basic, we use access tree based
access structure in our scheme.
Let us briefly explain the access tree. First choose a polynomial
qx for each node x (including the leaves) in the tree T. These
Global Setup (GS)− Same as the original.
AAs Setup (AS)− The initial setup is same as the original. We
consider more generic tree access structure. Hence we replace the
threshold access structure requirement into tree based as follows:
Ak specify mk as minimum number of attributes required to
satisfy the access structure ( mk ≤ nk).
Key Generation (KG)− Attribute set of user is A˜u:
A˜u ∩ A˜k = A˜
k
u ∀ k. Ak generates rk,u ∈R Zp and
polynomial qx for each node x (including the leaves) T.
For each node x, the degree dx of the polynomial qx is
dx = kx − 1 where kx – threshold value of that node.
Now, for the root node r, set qr(0) = rk,u. For any
other node x, set qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x)). Now
decryption keys for the user u is generated as follows:
D = Dk,u = g
−αkh
βk
rk,u+u h
rk,u
βk+u
1 , D
1
k,u = h
1
rk,u+u ,D
j
k,u =
h
qak,j
(0)
(βk+u)tk,j
1 ,∀ak,j ∈ A˜
k
u.
Encryption (E)− This exactly same as the original scheme.
Decryption (D)− In order to decrypt C, the user u, computes
X, Y and Sk as follows: X =
∏
k∈IC
e
(
C2, Dk,u
)
, Y =
e
(
C3,D
1
k,u
)
and Sk =
∏
ak,j∈A
k
m
e
(
Ck,j ,D
j
k,u
)∆
ak,j ,A˜
j
m
(0)
.
User then decrypts the message m as follows: m = C1X
Y
∏
k∈IC
Sk
.
Fig. 2. The proposed decentralized KP-ABE scheme. This shows the
difference between the original and the proposed algorithm.
polynomials are chosen in the following way in a top-down
manner, starting from the root node r. For each node x in the
tree, set the degree dx of the polynomial qx to be one less than
the threshold value kx of that node, that is, dx = kx − 1. Now,
for the root node r, set qr(0) = rk,u and dr other points of the
polynomial qr randomly to define it completely. For any other
node x, set qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x)) and choose dx other
points randomly to completely define qx. Once the polynomials
have been decided, for each leaf node x, we give the secret value
Dk,u, D
1
k,u and Djk,u, ∀ak,j ∈ A˜ku as shown in Fig. 2 to the
user. Hence user can decryption keys if and only if T(A˜ku) = 1.
Let us denote the set of attributes used to encrypt message m
as A˜m and the common attribute set between message m and the
AA k as A˜km i.e., A˜m = {A˜1m, . . . , A˜km, . . . , A˜Nm}. Let us also
denote the index set of AAs involved in the ciphertext of message
m as Ic. The encryption algorithm (E ) in Fig. 2 encrypts the
message m ∈ G2 using an attribute set A˜m. In order to encrypt the
message, the message owner randomly generates s and computes
ciphertext C =
[
C1, C2, C3, Ck,j ,∀ak,j ∈ A˜km
]
. If the user has
decryption keys for the attributes of message m then he can obtain
the message m from the ciphertext using the following four steps
by executing the decryption algorithm (D). First, user can use
decryption key Dk,u and C2 to compute X as
X =
∏
k∈IC
e (C2, Dk,u) =
∏
k∈IC
e
(
gs, g−αkh
βk
rk,u+u h
rk,u
βk+u
1
)
,
=
∏
k∈IC
e (g, g)−sαk
∏
k∈IC
e (g, h)
sβk
rk,u+u
∏
k∈IC
e (g, h1)
srk,u
βk+u ,
then user uses decryption key D1k,u and C3 to compute Y as
Y=e
(
C3, D
1
k,u
)
= e
 ∏
k∈IC
gβks, h
1
rk,u+u
=∏
k∈IC
e (g, h)
sβk
rk,u+u ,
and uses Djk,u, Ck,j , ∀ak,j ∈ A˜
j
m and polynomial interpolation
to get rk,u as
Sk =
∏
ak,j∈A˜
k
m
e
(
Ck,j , D
j
k,u
)∆
ak,j∈A˜m,A˜
j
m
(0)
,
=
∏
ak,j∈A˜
k
m
e(g, h1)
s
(βk+u)
qak,j (0)∆
ak,j∈A˜m,A˜
j
m
(0)
,
where qak,j (0) = qparent(ak,j)(index(ak,j)). Hence, Sk =
e(g, h1)
srk,u
(βk+u) . Now user can get the message m using C1 and
pre-computed values X, Y, Sk, ∀k as follows:
C1X
Y
∏
k∈IC
Sk
=

m.
∏
k∈IC
e(g, g)αks
∏
k∈IC
e(g, h)
sβk,u
rk+u
 ×

∏
k∈IC
e (g, g)−sαk
∏
k∈IC
e (g, h)
sβk
rk,u+u
∏
k∈IC
e (g, h1)
srk,u
βk+u
∏
k∈IC
e(g, h1)
srk,u
βk+u
 = m.
D. Security Analysis
Theorem 1. The proposed scheme is semantically secure against
chosen plain text attack (CPA) in the selective ID model, if there
exist negligible function υ such that, any adversary will succeed
the security game explained earlier with probability at most 1
2
+υ.
Proof. Suppose if there is a probabilistic polynomial time adver-
sary who can break our algorithm then there will be a challenger
who can break the DBDH assumption by exploiting the adversary.
Lets assume that the challenger is provided with [ga, gb, gc, Z]
and if the challenger wants to break the DBDH assumption then
he needs to determine whether Z = eˆ(g, g)abc or not with at least
1
2
+ υ probability.
Let us assume that there is an adversary who can break the
proposed algorithm. In this section, we will show that the chal-
lenger can use such an adversary to break the DBDH assumption.
In order to exploit such an adversary, the challenger needs to
incorporate the given [ga, gb, gc, Z] within the proposed algorithm
(i.e., Fig. 2). First of all, let us explain how the challenger incor-
porates [ga, gb, gc, Z] within the global setup, AA setup, and key
generation sub-algorithms. We stress here that this incorporation
is indistinguishable from the steps provided in Fig. 2.
Initially, as explained in the security game, the adversary must
submit a set of attributes and a set of AAs he wants to challenge.
Let us denote the set of attributes provided by the adversary as
A˜C = {A˜1C , . . . , A˜
k
C , . . . , A˜
N
C } where A˜kC = A˜C
⋂
A˜k and a list
of corrupted AAs as CA. One of the conditions as given in security
game is that at least there will be one honest AA for each user
whereby the adversary can get insufficient number of decryption
credentials [11]. Let us denote GID of a particular user as ω and
the corresponding honest AA as κ, and it’s access structure Tκ
hence Tκ(A˜κC ∩ A˜κω) = 0. Hence, we can divide the AAs who
maintain attributes AC into three: corrupted AAs, AAs who are
not corrupted and not κ, and κ.
Firstly, challenger generates two random values γ, η R
←−−−
Zp
and sets h = gagγ and h1 = ga
η
= gaη. For the corrupted AAs
Ak ∈ CA: The challenger generates vk, βk, wk,j R←−−−Zp and
sets Yk = e(g, g)vk , Zk = gβk and {Tk,j = gwk,j}ak,j∈A˜k .
Hence, the public-secret key pairs for Ak ∈ CA is given as
{(vk, βk, [wk,1, . . . , wk,nk ]), (Yk, Zk, [Tk,1, . . . , Tk,nk ])}. Chal-
lenger provides the secret-public key pairs of the corrupted AAs
to the adversary. Hence, the adversary can compute Dk,ω, D1k,ω,
and Djk,ω,∀ak,j ∈ A˜kω himself for user ω without interacting with
the challenger.
For the AAs who are not corrupted and not κ (i.e., Ak /∈
CA ∪ κ): Challenger generates vk, βk, wk,j R←−−−Zp and sets
Yk = e(g
b, gvk) = e(g, g)bvk , and Zk = gβk . For the attributes
ak,j ∈ A˜C ∩ A˜k, the challenger sets Tk,j = gwk,j . Other at-
tributes i.e., ak,j ∈ A˜k − A˜kC , the challenger sets Tk,j = h
wk,j
1 =
gaηwk,j . Hence, the public-secret key pairs for Ak /∈ CA ∪ κ is
given as {(bvk, βk, wk,1, . . . , wk,nk), (Yk, Zk, Tk,1, . . . , Tk,nk )}.
Challenger sends public keys (Yk, Zk, Tk,1, [Tk,1, . . . , Tk,nk ])
to the adversary. Now AA Ak assigns a polynomial qx with
degree dx for every node in it’s access tree Tk. It first sets
up a polynomial qx of degree dx for the root node x. It
sets qx(0) = rk,ω and then sets rest of the points randomly
to completely fix qx. Now it sets polynomials for each child
node x′ of x as follows: qx′(0) = qx(index(x′)). Then
computes Dk,ω = g−bvkg
(a+γ)βk
rk,ω+ω g
aηrk,ω
βk+ω , D1k,ω = g
a+γ
rk,ω+ω ,
and Djk,ω = g
aηqparent(ak,j )
(index(ak,j ))
(βk+ω)wk,j ,∀ak,j ∈ A˜C ∩ A˜k or
Djk,ω = g
qparent(ak,j )
(index(ak,j )))
(βk+ω)wk,j ,∀ak,j ∈ A˜k − A˜kC
If Ak = κ: Challenger generates βκ, wκ,j R←−−−Zp.
Challenger sets Yκ = e(ga, gb)
n∏
j=1,j 6=κ
Y −1j =
e(g, g)

ab− ∑
Ak /∈CA∪κ
bvk−
∑
Ak∈CA
vk


, Zκ = g
βκ
. For the
attributes aκ,j ∈ A˜C ∩ A˜κ, the challenger sets Tκ,j = gwκ,j .
Other attributes i.e., aκ,j ∈ A˜κ − A˜κC , the challenger sets
Tκ,j = h
wκ,j
1 = g
(aη)wκ,j
. Hence, the public-secret key
pairs for Ak = κ is given as [(ab −
∑
Ak /∈CA∪κ
bvk −∑
Ak∈CA
vk), βk, wk,1, ..., wk,nk , (Yκ, Zκ, Tκ,1, ...)]. Challenger
sends public keys (Yκ, Zκ, Tκ,1, ...) to the adversary.
Since Tκ(A˜κC ∩ A˜κω) = 0, it should be stressed that maximum
dx − 1 number of children of node x could be satisfied. It first
defines a polynomial qx of degree dx for the root node x such
that qx(0) = r′. For each satisfied child x′ of x, the procedure
chooses a random point ex′ and sets qx(index(x′)) = ex′ . We
will show later in this section that it is possible to implicitly
define remaining children nodes using polynomial interpolation.
Now it recursively defines polynomials for the rest of the
nodes in the tree as follows. For each child node x′ of x,
qx′(0) = qx(index(x
′)). Computes
Dκ,ω = g

−ab+ ∑
Ak /∈CA∪k∗
bvk+
∑
Ak∈CA
vk


g
(a+γ)βκ
(r+ω) g
aηr′
βκ+ω , D1κ,ω =
g
(a+γ)
(r+ω) , and Djκ,ω = h
qparentaκ,j
(index(aκ,j ))
wκ,j
1 ∀aκ,j ∈ AC ∩ A˜k
or Djκ,ω = g
r′∆0,S(aκ,j )+
dκ−1∑
i=1
ei∆i,S(aκ,j )
wκ,j ,∀aκ,j ∈ A˜k − A˜kC
where r′ = r + b (βκ+ω)
η
.
The following lemma proves Dκ,ω and Djκ,ω are correct and
the challenger can generate these without knowing a, b, c from
ga, gb, gc.
Lemma 1. Dκ,ω and Djκ,ω are correct and they can be generated
by challenger without knowing a, b, c from ga, gb, gc.
Proof. In the beginning of the access structure we chosen e1, e2,
. . ., edκ−1 random values for children nodes of root node and we
set qx(0) = r′ = r+b (βκ+ω)η . Hence, using the polynomial inter-
polation technique, we can implicitly assign values to other chil-
dren nodes of root using the following valid polynomial function:
qx = r
′∆0,S(x) +
dκ−1∑
i=1
ei∆i,S(x), S ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , dκ − 1}.
During the key extraction, for the correctness, the challenger hides
r′ in attribute aκ,j ∈ {A˜k− A˜kC}. Since, Tκ,j = h
wκ,j
1 , the Djκ,ω
∀ aκ,j ∈ {A˜k − A˜
k
C} is given as
Djκ,ω= g
qparent(aκ,j )
(index(aκ,j ))
wκ,j =g
r′∆0,S(aκ,j )+
dκ−1∑
i=1
ei∆i,S(aκ,j )
wκ,j ,
which is valid and identical to that in the original scheme. Now
we will prove that the challenger can generate Djκ,ω and Dκ,ω
for aκ,j ∈ {A˜k − A˜kC} without knowing a, b, and c.
Djκ,ω = g
(
r+b
(βκ+ω)
η
)
∆0,S(aκ,j )+
dκ−1∑
i=1
ei∆i,S(aκ,j )
wκ,j ,
=
[
gr
(
gb
)(βκ+ω
η
)]∆0,S(aκ,j )
wκ,j dκ−1∏
i=1
g
ei∆i,S(aκ,j )
wκ,j ,
and
Dκ,ω=g

−ab+ ∑
Ak /∈CA∪κ
bvk+
∑
Ak∈CA
vk


g
(a+γ)βκ
(r+ω) g
aηr′
βκ+ω
=g

−ab+ ∑
Ak /∈CA∪κ
bvk+
∑
Ak∈CA
vk


g
(a+γ)βκ
(r+ω) g
aη(r+b
(βκ+ω)
η
)
βκ+ω
=
(
gb
) ∑
Ak /∈CA∪κ
vk


g

 ∑
Ak∈CA
vk


h
βκ
r+ω h
r
βκ+ω
1 
Once adversary received all the credential from the challenger, he
will send two messages, m0 and m1 to the challenger. Now the
challenger randomly chooses one of the messages and encrypts
it and sends the encrypted message back to the adversary. Let us
denote the message chosen by the challenger as mb where b = 0
or 1 and the encrypted message as C = {C1 = mb.Z, C2 =
gc, C3 =
∏
k∈AC
(gc)βkand {Ck,j = (gc)wk,j}∀k∈IC ,ak,j∈A˜jm}.
We stress here that C is a valid encryption of the message mb
if Z = e(g, g)abc. Hence, the adversary should have his usual
non-negligible advantage υ of correctly identifying the message
mb. However, when Z 6= e(g, g)abc, then C is just random
value, hence, the adversary can have no more than 1
2
probability
of guessing correctly. Hence, if the adversary guesses correctly
then challenger guesses that Z = e(g, g)abc and if adversary
is wrong then challenger guesses that Z 6= e(g, g)abc, hence,
the challenger has an advantage of υ
2
in distinguishing whether
Z = e(g, g)abc. Hence, an adversary who breaks our scheme
with advantage υ implies an algorithm for breaking DBDH
assumption with non-negligible advantage υ
2
. We can conclude
that the proposed scheme is selective ID secure.
III. ANONYMOUS KEY ISSUING PROTOCOL
In order to issue keys to the users, Han et. al. [6] used key
extraction protocol. The key extraction protocol joins secrets
known to the user and AA via simple operation which let the users
to collude successfully. To avoid the user collusion, we have to
use schemes which support non-linear coupling of secrets, hence
we are considering anonymous key issuing protocol based on
anonymous credential system (See Section III-C for more details).
In an anonymous credential system [14], the users can obtain and
prove the possession of credentials while remaining anonymous.
In such work it is assumed that each user has a unique secret
key i.e., GIDs. Then the user can interact with each AA under
a different pseudonym (generated using GID) in such a manner
that it is impossible to link multiple pseudonyms belonging to the
same user. In the proposed work, we exploited the anonymous
credentials to allow users to obtain decryption keys from the AAs
without revealing their GIDs.
In particular, in the proposed key issuing protocol, we coupled
the properties of anonymous credential system with ABE. Hence,
the user can obtain a set of decryption keys for his secret GID
without revealing any information about that GID to the AA (pre-
serve the privacy). At the same time, the AA is guaranteed that the
agreed upon decryption-keys are the only information that the user
learns from the transaction (i.e., provide security by mitigating
user collusion). This is derived from blind IBE schemes [15]. We
define this algorithm as [U(params,PKk, u,GID, decom)⇆
Ak(params,PKk, SKk)] → DecryptionKeysforUser. In
this algorithms, the user runs Commit and sends the com to AA
and keeps the decom [6]. Then the user and AA interact with
each other to generate decryption keys. The decryption keys for
the user will be generated only if the output of Decommit is 1.
From [15], the anonymous key extraction protocol should be leak-
free and selective-failure blindness. Definition and security games
for leak-free and selective-failure blindness can be found in [6],
hence we jump straight into the formulation.
A. Construction of anonymous key issuing protocol
Fig. 3 shows the anonymous key issuing protocol where
user with private value u ∈ Zp and Ak with private values
rk,u, βk and αk ∈ Zp jointly computing decryption keys for
the user. The decryption keys for u are Dk,u, D1k,u and Djk,u
∀ak,j ∈ A˜ku. In order to obtain these keys, first user and Ak
interact with each other using two-party protocol (2PC). The
2PC protocol can be done via a general 2PC protocol for a
simple arithmetic computation. Alternatively, we can do this more
efficiently using the construction in [8]. The 2PC protocol takes
(u, ρ1, ρ2) ∈ Zp from user and (rk,u, βk) ∈ Zp from Ak and
returns x = (u+βk)ρ1 mod p and y = (u+rk,u)ρ2 mod p to Ak.
Since, ρ1 and ρ2 were randomly generated by user, the AA Ak
cannot extract the user identity u from x and y. After executing
the 2PC protocol, the user now computes P = g
1
ρ1ρ2 , Q = h
1
ρ2
and R = h
1
ρ1
1 and send those values to Ak. Now Ak computes
D˜k,u, D˜1k,u and
˜Djk,u ∀ak,j ∈ A˜
k
u (i.e., randomized decryption
credentials) using P, Q, R, x and y and send them back to the
user. Now the user exponentiates the obtained values by ρ1ρ2 to
get the decryption keys. Note that, since u coupled non-linearly
within the decryption keys. We show in Section III-C that this
approach avoid user collusion.
B. Security Analysis
To obtain the decryption credential blindly from Ak ∀k, the user
needs to prove that he holds the identifier u in zero knowledge.
As shown in Fig. 3, the user randomly generates ρ1, ρ2 ∈R Zp
and computes Ψ1 = guρ1 ,Ψ2 = gρ1 ,Ψ3 = guρ2 , and Ψ4 = gρ2
as commitments. At the end of the 2PC protocol, the AA obtains
x = (rk,u + u)ρ1 mod p, y = (βk + u)ρ2 mod p. Then AA
verifies gx ?= ABrk,u and gy ?= CDrk,u . If they are correctly
verified then the AA continues otherwise it aborts.
Now AA needs to proof that he knows (αk, βkx ,
rk,u
y
) in zero
knowledge to the user. This will be done using the following steps:
1. Ak randomly generates b1, b2, b3 ∈R Zp, computes
˜
Dk,u =
P−b1Qb2Rb3 and sends ˜Dk,u, and D˜k,u to the user
2. User generates c1 ∈R Zp and sends it to the AA
3. AA computes b′1 = b1 − c1αk, b′2 = b2 − c1 βkx , b
′
3 = b3 −
c1
rk,u
y
and sends b′1, b′2, b′3 to the user
4. User verifies ˜Dk,u
?
= P−b
′
1Qb
′
2Rb
′
3D˜k,u
c1
, otherwise aborts
User U(params, PKk, u) AA Ak(params, PKk, SKk)
1. Randomly chooses u, ρ1, ρ2 ∈R Zp 2←−PC−−−→ x = (rk,u + u)ρ1, y = (βk + u)ρ2
PoK {(u, ρ1, ρ2) : Ψ1 = guρ1
∧
Ψ2 = gρ1
∧
Ψ3 = guρ2
∧
Ψ4 = gρ2}
2. Computes P = g
1
ρ1ρ2 , Q = h
1
ρ2 , R = h
1
ρ1
1
3. D˜k,u = P−αkQ
βk
x R
rk,u
y , D˜1k,u = Q
1
x ,
4. Dk,u =
(
D˜k,u
)ρ1ρ2
,
˜
D
j
k,u = R
pk,u(ak,j )
ytk,j ,∀ak,j ∈ A˜
k
u
D1k,u =
(
D˜1k,u
)ρ1ρ2
, D˜k,u, D˜
1
k,u,
˜
D
j
k,u,
∑
2
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Let
∑
2 denotes the proof:
D
j
k,u =
(
˜
D
j
k,u
)ρ1ρ2
,∀ak,j ∈ A˜
k
u PoK
{
(αk , x, y,
βk
x
,
rk,u
y
) : D˜k,u = P
−αkQ
βk
x R
rk,u
y
∧
D˜1k,u = Q
1
x
∧˜
D
j
k,u = R
pk,u(ak,j )
ytk,j ,∀ak,j ∈ A˜
k
u
}
Fig. 3. Anonymous key issuing protocol for decentralized KP-ABE
We ignored the zero-knowledge proofs for 1
x
and 1
y
for brevity
since they are similar to the above proof.
Theorem 3. The proposed anonymous key issuing protocol is
both leak-free and selective-failure blind.
Proof. Leak freeness. Suppose there exists an adversary U in
the real experiment (where U is interacting with an honest AA
Ak running the anonymous key issuing protocol) and a simulator
U˜ in the ideal experiment (where U˜ can access the trusted AA
running the key issuing protocol without privacy preservation)
such that no efficient distinguisher D can distinguish the real
experiment from the ideal experiment. The simulator U˜ simulates
the communication between the distinguisher D and the adversary
U by passing the input of D to U and the output of U to D. The
simulator U˜ works as follows:
1. U˜ sends the adversary U the public-key PKk of Ak
2. The adversary U must proof the possession of u in zero-
knowledge to U˜. If proof is successful then U˜ obtains
(u, ρ1, ρ2) using rewind technique
3. U˜ sends u to the trusted party. The trusted party runs KeyGen
to generates (Dk,u, D1k,u, Djk,u) and responds to U˜
4. Now U˜ computes
(
Dk,u
1
ρ1ρ2 , D1k,u
1
ρ1ρ2 , Djk,u
1
ρ1ρ2
)
and
sends them to U
If (Dk,u, D1k,u, Djk,u) are correct keys from the trusted AA in
the ideal experiment, then
(
Dk,u
1
ρ1ρ2 , D1k,u
1
ρ1ρ2 , Djk,u
1
ρ1ρ2
)
are the correct keys from Ak in the real experiment. Hence,
(Dk,u, D1k,u, Djk,u) and
(
Dk,u
1
ρ1ρ2 , D1k,u
1
ρ1ρ2 , Djk,u
1
ρ1ρ2
)
are
correctly distributed and no efficient distinguisher can distinguish
the real experiment with the ideal experiment.
Proof. Selective-failure blindness. The adversarial AA Ak sub-
mits the public key PKk, and two GIDs u0 and u1. Then, a
bit b ∈ {0, 1} is randomly selected. Ak can have a black box
access to u0’s and u1’s parameters i.e., U(params,PKk, ub)
and U(params,PKk, ub−1). Then, U executes the anonymous
key issuing protocol with Ak and outputs secret keys for ub and
u1−b i.e., SKub and SKu1−b .
1. If SKub 6=⊥ and SKu1−b 6=⊥ then Ak is given (SKub ,
SKu1−b )
2. If SKub 6=⊥ and SKu1−b =⊥ then Ak is given (ǫ, ⊥)
3. If SKub =⊥ and SKu1−b 6=⊥ then Ak is given (⊥, ǫ)
4. If SKub =⊥ and SKu1−b =⊥ then Ak is given (⊥, ⊥)
At the end Ak submits his prediction on b.
In the anonymous key issuing protocol, U sends four random
parameters Ψ1 = gubρ1 ∈ G1,Ψ2 = gρ1 ∈ G1,Ψ3 = gubρ2 ∈
G1, and Ψ4 = gρ2 ∈ G1 to the adversarial AA Ak and proves
PoK(ub, ρ1, ρ2). Now it is Ak’s turn to respond. So far, Akï£¡s
view on the two black boxes is computationally undistinguishable.
Otherwise, the hiding property of the commitment scheme and the
witness undistinguishable property of the zero-knowledge proof
will be broken. Suppose that Ak uses any computing strategy
to output secret keys {Dk,ub , D1k,ub , Djk,ub∀ak,j ∈ A˜
k
ub
} for the
first black box. In the following, we will show that Ak can predict
SKub of U without interacting with the two black boxes:
1. Ak checks
PoK
{
(αk,
βk
x
,
rk,u
y
) : D˜k,u = P
−αkQ
βk
x R
rk,u
y
∧
D˜1k,u = Q
1
x
∧˜Djk,u = R pk,u(ak,j )ytk,j ,∀ak,j ∈ A˜ku
}
If proof fails, Ak sets SK0 =⊥
2. Ak generates different secret keys
{Dk,ub , D1k,ub , Djk,ub∀ak,j ∈ A˜
k
ub
} for the second
black box and a proof of knowledge:
PoK
{
(αk,
βk
x
,
rk,u
y
) : D˜k,u = P
−αkQ
βk
x R
rk,u
y
∧
D˜1k,u = Q
1
x
∧˜Djk,u = R pk,u(ak,j )ytk,j ,∀ak,j ∈ A˜ku
}
If proof fails, Ak sets SK1 =⊥
3. Finally Ak outputs his prediction on (u0, u1) with (SKub ,
SKu1−b ) if SKub 6=⊥ and SKu1−b 6=⊥; (ǫ, ⊥) if
SKub 6=⊥ and SKu1−b =⊥; (⊥, ǫ) if SKub =⊥ and
SKu1−b 6=⊥; (⊥, ⊥) if SKub =⊥ and SKu1−b =⊥.
The predication on (u0, u1) is correct, and has the identical
distribution with the black box. Because Ak performs the same
check as the honest U , it outputs the valid keys as U obtains
from anonymous key issuing protocol. Hence, if Ak can predict
the final outputs of the two black boxes, the advantage of Ak in
distinguishing the two black boxes is the same without the final
outputs. Therefore, the advantage of Ak should come from the
received Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3,Ψ4 ∈ G1 and PoK(u, ρ1, ρ2). From the
hiding property of the commitment scheme and witness undis-
tinguishable property of the zero-knowledge proof, Ak cannot
distinguish one from the other with nonnegligible advantage.
Hence our anonymous key issuing protocol is secure against
selective-failure.
C. User collusion
In this section we demonstrate the user collusion vulnerability
in [6] identified by [7]. We will use a simple example for this,
however, a generic scenario is provided in [7]. Later we show
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Fig. 4. Comparison of computational costs of four different schemes against four different steps.
that the proposed scheme is free from the identified vulnerability
and discuss the reason. Lets consider a scenario with two AAs
A1 and A2. Let A1 monitors attribute {a1,1} and A2 monitors
{a2,1}. Hence according to the original scheme presented in Fig.
1, the public keys and secret keys of Ak are PKk = {Yk =
e(g, g)αk , Zk = g
βk , Tk,j = g
tk,1} and SKk = {αk, βk, tk,1}
for k = {1, 2}. Suppose the encryption algorithm specifies the
attribute set for message m is A˜m = {a1, a2} while the users
U1 and U2 with identifiers u1 and u2 only have the decryption
credential for the attribute {a1} and the user U3 with identifier
u3 only has the credential for attribute {a2}. Note that none of
these three users can decrypt the ciphertext alone. However, due
to the vulnerability in [6], these users can collude together and
generate decryption credentials to decrypt the ciphertext encrypted
by attribute set A˜m = {a1, a2} as follows: according to Fig. 1,
credential issued to U1 and U2 are
D1,u1 = g
α1hr1,u1hu1β11 , D1,1 = h
r1,u1
t1,1 ,
D1,u2 = g
α1hr1,u2hu2β11 , D2,1 = h
r1,u2
t1,1 ,
U1 and U2 can collude to compute the secret key corresponding
to the user U3 as follows:
D1,u3 = D1,u1 .
(
D1,u1
D1,u2
)u3−u1
u1−u2
= gα1h
r1,u1+
(r1,u1
−r1,u2)(u3−u1)
u1−u2 hu3β11 =g
α1hr1,u3hu3β11 ,
D3,1 = D1,1.
(
D1,1
D2,1
)u3−u1
u1−u2
= h
r1,u1
t1,1
+
(r1,u1
−r1,u2
)(u3−u1)
(u1−u2)t1,1 = h
r1,u3
t1,1 .
Note that D1,u3 and D3,1 are valid credentials for U3 for
attribute a1,1 since the power of h1 (i.e., u3β1) and power of
h1 (i.e., random value r1,u1+ (r1,u1−r1,u2 )(u3−u1)u1−u2 ) are correctly
produced in the credentials D1,u3 and D3,1 due to the collusion.
Let us analyse the reason behind this successful collusion. If we
look at the variables (i.e., β1, and u3) in the power of h1 in D1,u3 ,
β1 is known to AA and u3 are known to the user. However, the
power, β1u3 is just a multiplication (it is very naive) of both the
variables. Hence the users can remove u1 and u2 while keeping β1
using the above simple algebraic operations to produce decryption
credential for U3.
In the proposed scheme, if we compute D1,u1 .
(
D1,u1
D1,u2
)γ
then the power of the generator h becomes
β1
r1,u1+u1
+γ
(
β1
r1,u1+u1
− β1
r1,u2+u2
)
, and the power of generator
h1 becomes
r1,u1
β1+u1
+ γ
(
r1,u1
β1+u1
−
r1,u2
β1+u2
)
where γ could be
any scalar (i.e., u3−u1
u1−u2
). It is obvious from both the powers,
even though users know u1 and u2, they cannot remove the u1
and u2 since they are coupled non-linearly with r1,u1 , r1,u2 and
β1 which are known only to the AA (i.e., 1r1,u1+u1 ,
1
β1+u1
).
Hence, u1 and u2 cannot be replaced with u3 without knowing
β1, r1,u1 and r1,u2 . Hence our method withstands the collusion
found in [6]. In general, since the variable known to user and
the variables known to the AA are non-linearly coupled in our
scheme, it is impossible for two users to generate decryption
credential for third user without involving AA.
IV. COMPLEXITY COMPARISON
In this section, we compare the computational complexity of
our scheme against the following KP-ABE schemes: Han et. al
decentralized KP-ABE scheme [6], Chase MA-ABE KP-ABE
scheme with central AA [11], and Chase et.al MA-ABE KP-
ABE scheme without central AA [12]. Let us assume there are
N number of AAs and each AA monitors n number of attributes.
In order to compare the complexity at worst case scenario, let us
assume that the ciphertext encrypted using all the attributes in the
system (i.e., nN ) and user has decryption credentials for all the
attributes. Let us denote the computational time (in ms) for one
multiplication, one exponentiation, and one pairing as Cm, Ce,
and Cp, respectively.
In order to simulate, we use the benchmark time values given
in the popular pairing-based cryptography library namely jPBC
in [16]. Table I shows the time values (in ms) for Cm, Ce, and
Cp for two different testbeds: testbed 1 uses Intel(R) Core(TM) 2
Quad CPU Q6600 with 2.40GHz and 3 GB memory running on
Ubuntu 10.04 and testbed 2 uses HTC Desire HD A9191 smart
phone running on Android 2.2. The time values given in Table I
are for a symmetric elliptic curve called a-curve, where the base
field size is 512-bit and the embedding degree is 2. The a-curve
has a 160-bit group order.
We consider the healthcare scenario described in Section I as
an example to simulate the comparison of four different schemes.
Without loss of generality lets assume N = 2 and n varies from 1
to 10. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, each algorithm consists of four
sub algorithms. Fig. 4 compares the performance of four schemes
across four sub algorithms. In Fig. 4(a), the time complexity for
setting up the ABE system for all four algorithms increase linearly
with same order against the number of attributes per AA. Setup
cost for [11] is better than other schemes. It is due to a simplest
problem formulation without privacy consideration (i.e., central
AA knows secret keys of all AAs).
In Fig. 4(b), the key generation time complexity for [12]
increases quadratically with number of attributes due to the
interaction between pair of AAs to agree on a shared secret per
TABLE I
TIME COMPLEXITY MEASURES FOR TWO DIFFERENT TESTBEDS.
Testbed 1 (ms) Testbed 2 (ms)
Cp 14.6 491.2
Ce 2.8 34.1
Cm 1.8 20
attribute. However, complexity of other schemes increase linearly
with almost same order. Complexity of the proposed scheme
is high when n = 1 due to generation of other independent
credential Dk,u. Han et. al. scheme performs better than the
proposed scheme due the difference in number of credentials
generated in both the schemes.
In Fig. 4(c), the time complexity for encryption increases
linearly with same order for all schemes similar to the setup. Han
et. al’s scheme and the proposed scheme show equal performance
while other two schemes also show equal performance. This
clearly shows that there is no significant difference in Encryption
sub algorithm and new schemes are built on top of the previous
schemes.
Finally the time complexity of decryption shown in Fig. 4(d)
is slightly different compared to other three sub algorithms. Even
though the time complexity of all four algorithms increase linearly,
the orders are different for all four algorithms. In fact Han et. al
perform better than [12] after n = 10. The proposed algorithm
takes longer (roughly 10ms longer for 10 attributes) to decrypt
messages than other algorithms. This is solely due to the additional
operations involved for the privacy protection. In overall, Chase’s
scheme [11] performs better than other three schemes due to it’s
simplicity. However, the algorithms in [11], [12] need a central
AA and/or interaction among AAs; hence [11], [12] are vulnerable
for single point of failure. The proposed scheme and Han et.
al’s scheme are performing equally well as each other. However,
the proposed algorithm mitigates the user collusion vulnerability
compared to [6]. Due to page limitation, we restricted to N = 2
case, however we observed the similar trend for N > 2 cases.
Let us now compare the ciphertext length and performance of
the proposed scheme on mobile platform. Fig. 5(a) shows cipher-
text length for all schemes against the number of attributes. The
ciphertext length is increasing linearly with number of attributes
at same order for all schemes. This is one of the drawbacks of
these schemes; hence, developing a novel scheme which ensures
the user’s privacy with constant size ciphertext could be a potential
future work. Recent trend of Internet of Things replaces PCs
with smart devices and it is anticipated that decryption part of
the proposed scheme could be done on mobile device i.e., users
want to download and read data on their smartphones. To compare
the performance on smartphones against PC, we simulate the
time complexity of decryption sub algorithm on both the test
beds given in Table I. As expected, Fig. 5(b) shows that the
decryption process on smartphone is much slower than PC. More
importantly, even though the time complexity on both the test
beds are increasing linearly, the complexity on test bed 2 increases
with higher order than PC. The main reason behind this is that the
mobile device used in test bed 2 is equipped with one processor.
This led the non-linear relationship of Cp between both the test
beds (in test bed 1, Cp ∼= 5Cm but in test bed 2 Cp ∼= 14Cm).
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Fig. 5. (a) Ciphertext length of four different schemes, (b) decryption
complexity of the proposed scheme is two different test beds.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a PP KP-ABE scheme for a dis-
tributed data sharing environment. The proposed scheme enables
users to download and decrypt the data from online such as cloud
without revealing their attributes to the third-parties. The novelty
of the work is to mitigate the user collusion attack in the existing
scheme. We used anonymous key issuing protocol to strengthen
the bind between user identity and decryption keys; hence, two
or more users cannot pool their keys to generate decryption
keys for an unauthorized user. We validated the security of the
proposed scheme using the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman
standard complexity assumption.
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